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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION, THE RIGHT TO




The rapid advances in the technology of communication are
moving our society ever closer to what scores of futurists have
long predicted: A world in which we all sit at home, visiting with
one another only through our telecommunication devices.' To
be sure, that world is still a good way off, but it is unnecessary to
keep one's ear to the ground in order to hear the hoofbeats of its
advance. The signs of change are all around us, and as the
changes come, they continue, as Grant Gilmore once suggested,
to unsettle both our law and our selves.'
The law of intellectual property-a form of law that exists at
least in part to govern and encourage technological advance-
has been no less unsettled than has any other body of law. Copy-
right law in particular has turned magnificent analytical somer-
saults in order to accommodate new forms of expression of
ideas.3 The literature has been full of recommendations for doc-
trinal change. Yet through it all, the discussion has been analytic
and programmatic, asking the ubiquitous question: How can we
best . . . ? Far too little attention, however, has been paid to the
possibly more important question: Can we at all? Here, as else-
where in our policy-oriented society, there seems to be a rush to
regulate in pursuit of some chimeric public good, with questions
of morality and even of constitutionality often postponed.
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The Supreme Court's decision last Term in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax),4 serves to illustrate
the problem. In Betamax, the Court resolved, at least for the mo-
ment, the controversy over the legal status of home recording of
copyrighted television programs. As the parties and the Justices
framed the case, the central issue was whether when an individ-
ual, in the privacy of her own home, records a copyrighted pro-
gram, the recording is a fair use within the meaning of Section
107, of the Copyright Act.5 The subsidiary question-although
as a practical matter the more important one-was whether the
manufacturers of home video recording equipment are shielded
from liability as contributory infringers. For the time being, the
official answer to both questions is "Yes." Neither those who
record the programs nor those who manufacture the recorders
are liable. Yet the battle can hardly be regarded as over. Only
the arena has shifted, now to the Congress, where the producers
of copyrighted programming hope to regain what they seem to
have lost.
6
One way to look at the issue in Betamax-and apparently the
only way most observers have considered it-is this: How can
copyright law best cope with the problem of recording, a prob-
lem unforeseen when the statute was enacted? Fair use may have
been the analytical battleground on which the parties met, but
everyone knows what the case was really about: The home video
recording market is bigger than anyone thought it would be, and
the producers of television programming want a piece of the ac-
tion. Thus despite their loss in the Supreme Court, the produ-
cers will continue their efforts (temporarily shelved because 1984
is an election year) to obtain congressional passage of legislation
that would tax the sale of home video recorders and blank tapes
4 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
5 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
6 See, e.g., Fuerbringer, Entertainment Industry Vows Fight in Congress, N.Y. Times, Jan.
18, 1984, at D20, col. 5; Harmetz, An Unhappy Hollywood Weighs the Next Move, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1984, at D21, col. 5.
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and, through some scheme or other, divide the proceeds of that
tax among industry members to compensate them for copyright
royalties they are purportedly losing. In other words, even
though the Betamax lawsuit was styled as an injunction action, the
industry does not really want to prevent home video recording.
Rather, the industry wants consumers to go ahead and make
home recordings but to pay the copyright holders for the
privilege.
This fairly simple observation may mask a concern over the
problem just mentioned: There are important limits, both moral
and constitutional, on government power to rescue the copyright
holders. The industry, after all, is fond of pointing out that even
though it filed the Betamax suit and is lobbying the Congress, it
certainly does not want to enter anyone's home to take her video
recorder away. That concession is an important one, both for
practical reasons-one can imagine the uproar the contrary posi-
tion would generate-and, as will become clear, quite possibly
for good constitutional reasons as well.
That concession also points toward a potential flaw in the
industry's theory that it is entitled to share the profits from home
taping-and, one presumes, ultimately from many other uses to
which consumers might put signals that are sent into their
homes. Consider the history of the Betamax case. The primary
defendants were the manufacturers of video recording equip-
ment. The manufacturers were sued not as infringers, but as
contributory infringers. According to the courts, a contributory
infringer is "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing con-
duct of another. . . ."' Note the key element of this definition:
"the infringing conduct of another" must exist. In other words,
as might be expected, one can be held liable as a contributory
infringer only if there is an underlying infringement. In the
Betamax case, the requisite underlying infringement would have
been recording by private parties in their homes. The defen-
dants had a judgment because the Supreme Court ruled that the
home taping-the conduct the industry labeled infringement-
was actually a form of fair use.'
This much simply reviews recent history. I would like to go
further, however, by discussing an alternate ground for decision
7 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted).
8 104 S. Ct. at 791-96.
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in Betamax, one which, unlike the limited issue of statutory con-
struction on which the judgment turned, would have implications
far beyond the case, implications that would surely touch any
congressional effort to modify the Copyright Act to enable the
industry to share the profits it covets. I refer to the possibility
that the private, non-commercial use of video recording technol-
ogy might be entitled to constitutional protection.
The possibility that individuals might enjoy a constitutional
right to record signals that enter their homes without paying a
penalty has been mentioned in the debate but never discussed in
detail.9 Yet I think it plain that the possibility merits further in-
vestigation. Should a privilege of this nature be found, it would
most likely be a branch of the right to privacy. I admit that on
first hearing, the notion that the Constitution might protect video
recording seems at best implausible and at worst outrageous, but
if you will bear with me a bit longer, I will try to paint a picture
that will convince you at the very least that the possibility of con-
stitutional protection should be taken seriously.
And why shouldn't it be taken seriously? After all, so many
things that are done in the home, from reading obscene
magazines to using contraceptives to resisting arrest, have been
held by the Supreme Court to be protected by one constitutional
provision or another.' 0 In fact, as I hope will become clear, it is
not at all facetious to suggest that the Supreme Court has drawn
a bright line at the door of an individual's dwelling, and that in
order to cross that line and punish conduct within, the govern-
ment must have an awfully powerful reason. When measured
against the background that I will shortly sketch, the idea of a
right to privacy that protects noncommercial home video record-
ing will, I hope, seem less outrageous-perhaps even plausible.
And plausibility is really all I seek to establish.
The implications of a right of this kind are easy to imagine.
Suddenly the congressional debate on whether to amend the
Copyright Act in the wake of Betamax would no longer focus
alone on the wisdom or fairness of compensating copyright hold-
ers for the home recording of their programs. Instead, the de-
bate would have to consider a question not formally before the
Court in the Betamax case: Has the government the power to regu-
late home video recording? Because if it lacks the power-if the
9 See, e.g., Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamax
Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1525-26 (1982) (implying that privacy questions may make
direct enforcement difficult).
10 See infra notes 35-69 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline -- 3 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.  292 1984
COPYRIGHT AND PRIVACY
Constitution prohibits any government effort to control home
video recording-then there is no copyright infringement, hence
no contributory infringement, and hence no basis for industry
complaints about lost revenue.
Naturally, a right of this nature would not necessarily be lim-
ited to the narrow circumstances of the Betamax case. Entertain-
ment companies send increasing numbers of signals into private
homes, whether through cables or through the air. Some home-
owners have purchased or constructed devices to pluck these sig-
nals from the ether without the consent of the sender. So far,
courts have looked askance at this practice." But suppose the
receiver were to interpose a claim of constitutional right? At the
very least, a claim of this kind would raise the discussion to a
different plane.
I will not, in this Article, seek to argue that the constitutional
right of privacy in some sense "really does" protect home video
recording and related activities. As will shortly become clear, I
do not think that is even an important question, to say nothing of
whether it is a sensible one.' 2 Instead, I will seek to assess the
likelihood that some federal court, somewhere in the country,
might be persuaded that the right to privacy extends this far. In
this sense, my Article is less a brief for the benefit of litigants
than it is a memorandum to the members of Congress, sug-
gesting that when the inevitable vote on taxing the sale of video
recorders and blank tapes arrives-and it will-members ought
to pause and wonder whether they are responding to a problem
that does not exist, or more to the point, a problem of which the
government cannot take official cognizance. In short, I am pro-
posing no more than a thought experiment, but one which will
help determine whether the Congress ought to worry about the
constitutional status of any measure that is aimed at recapturing
from consumers the revenues lost through what may well be con-
stitutionally protected activity.
In painting my little picture to explain why the members
should worry, I will begin by using broad strokes to fill in the
I I See, e.g., Gruson, L.IL Judge Fines 8 in Cable TV Piracy, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1984, at
B5, col. 1. Recently enacted congressional legislation will preempt many state laws
against signal piracy. For a discussion of the legislation, see infra note 90 and accompa-
nying text.
12 1 do not count myself among those who believe that the less determinate provi-
sions of the Constitution "really do" have inherent meanings, nor am I certain that de-
vices such as "the intent of the drafters" can rescue them. For a general statement of my
views on this point, see Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Pre-
liminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. (March 1985) (forthcoming).
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relevant background-the role of constitutional analysis in con-
sidering economic regulatory statutes in general and intellectual
property statutes in particular. I will then sketch quickly in one
small corner of the canvas the analytical method I plan to use-
and of course, its justification. From there, I will move on to etch
in sharp, bold lines the facets of the modern right to privacy that
are most important for the home video recording issue. I will
then use lighter, more general strokes to suggest how a court
might analyze home video recording in light of that right to pri-
vacy. Finally, I will sketch in more tentative lines some possible
implications were the courts to decide to enforce a right as broad
as the one I am suggesting.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
A. The Constitution in Society
In our maturing constitutional democracy, there is some-
times a tendency, as Henry Monaghan has mused, to view the
Constitution as perfect, as guaranteeing any set of rights that
someone chooses to assert.' 3 And gazing about the constitu-
tional landscape, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that virtu-
ally no provision of law, no matter how artfully drafted, is
completely immune from constitutional challenge if a lawyer is
sufficiently clever, or from judicial excision if the judge is suffi-
ciently determined. So we have had the Defense Department's
policy of suspending contractors who commit fraud struck down
as a denial of due process 14 and the provisions of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 permitting judges to appoint counsel 15
invalidated as a form of slavery.' 6 Naturally, these decisions are
sometimes overturned on appeal, but sometimes they are not.
And even when they are, the temporarily invalidated statute is
shrouded in shadow until the litigation ends. There is, in short,
no statute of which we can say with assurance: "This one, at
least, does not live on borrowed time."
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to treat economic regula-
tory statutes as somehow belonging to a different landscape, one
on which questions about constitutionality should rarely arise.
13 See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981).
14 See Old Dominion Dairy Prods. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953, 964 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
15 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982).
16 See In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Proceedings,
475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979), vacated sub nom., White v. United States Pipe & Foun-
dry Co., 646 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1981).
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The idea that an economic regulatory statute might actually be
unconstitutional smacks of Lochnerism.17 In more primitive times,
courts treated economic regulatory statutes with the same dis-
dain that greeted other enactments, but in recent years, constitu-
tional challenges to economic regulatory statutes have only rarely
met with success. When courts have ruled against these statutes,
moreover, the results have been held up to ridicule. As a result,
challenges to regulatory statutes usually object to particular con-
structions placed on them by administrative agencies, and if con-
stitutional arguments are raised at all, they are generally raised as
afterthoughts. Yet the provisions of the Constitution form a test
that must be passed successfully by all, not just some, legislation,
and those protections should not be ignored merely because the
statute in question regulates economic life. The mere fact that
few regulatory statutes are unconstitutional should hardly be
taken as evidence that no one of them is.
B. Copyright and the Constitution
The Constitution limits congressional exercises of authority
under the Copyright Clause1 8 just as it limits congressional exer-
cises of authority under every other clause. This simple truth
should be self-evident, and yet, for reasons that are obscure, few
defendants charged with infringing someone else's rights in in-
tellectual property have raised constitutional claims. Perhaps
they have been cowed by the weak argument that intellectual
property rights themselves have a constitutional status. 9 More
likely, they have been discouraged by the almost invariable judi-
cial repudiation of the most obvious constitutional claim-that
the first amendment serves as a shield for those who would "vio-
late" another's intellectual property right.
Typical of the judicial treatment of this defense in intellec-
tual property cases is the opinion by the District Court for the
District of Columbia in Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental
Action Foundation."° Reddy Communications was proprietor of a
trademark, a character known as Reddy Kilowatt, which was used
17 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, grants Congress the power: "To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
19 Cf. Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate. From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 873
(1971) (arguing that the copyright clause forms part of constitutional mandate for a
competitive economy).
20 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 630 (D.D.C. 1977) (denying preliminary injunction). The de-
fendants ultimately prevailed on statutory grounds. See 477 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1979).
1984] 295
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in advertising and promotional materials projecting a favorable
image for the electric power industry. The Foundation used a
caricature of Reddy Kilowatt in materials critical of the industry.
When Reddy Communications sued for trademark infringement,
the Foundation raised as a defense the argument that its use of
the trademark was political speech and, therefore, an exercise of
its first amendment right to free expression. The court rejected
this defense, reasoning that the Foundation had available to it
other paths for expressing its views, whereas Reddy Communica-
tions, the trademark proprietor, had no means other than the
trademark laws to protect its interest. 21 A balancing test analyz-
ing the content of speech is alien to most mainstream first amend-
ment analysis,22 but the approach of the district court in Reddy
Communications typifies the short shrift given arguments of this
kind in intellectual property cases.23
Defendants in copyright infringement cases have fared only
slightly better. The well-known case of Walt Disney Productions v.
Air Pirates24 is generally thought to have laid to rest modern first
amendment arguments in the field. There the Ninth Circuit re-
jected, on grounds similar to those set forth in Reddy Communica-
tions, an underground comic book's claim that its parody of
copyrighted characters was protected as free expression. 5 The
court recognized that "some tension" exists "between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act," but concluded that the
comic book publisher could have expressed its theme "without
copying Disney's protected expression."'2 6 That of course is true,
but again, it strikes an awkward chord when compared with the
usual first amendment melody.
Naturally, those who have claimed first amendment rights-
or something very much like first amendment rights-have not
always lost their cases. One celebrated case in which a first
amendment defense prevailed is Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Asso-
21 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 634.
22 Balancing is somewhat more common-if nonetheless controversial-in analysis
of time, place, and manner restrictions. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
541 n.10 (1980).
23 See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1979); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977); Interbank Card Ass'n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp. 131 (M.D.N.C. 1977). For
a critique, see Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging
Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158.
24 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
25 Id. at 758-59.
26 Id. at 759.
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ciates.27 There a federal court ruled that the doctrine of fair use
protected publication of a book on the assassination of President
Kennedy, even though the book used drawings admittedly based
on the Zapruder film, on which the plaintiff held the copyright.
The court did not undertake an explicit first amendment analysis,
but it did rule implicitly in favor of the public's right to know,
stating that the defendant should prevail because of the "public
interest in having the fullest information available on the murder
of President Kennedy. ' ' 28 Apart from that argument, the court
indulged a standard fair use calculus, considering such issues as
the injury to the copyright owner and the effect, if any, on the
market for the copyrighted work.29 But the first amendment
overtones of the court's analysis should not be ignored.
There are a few other cases in which first amendment argu-
ments, dressed up as fair use claims, have succeeded, but for the
most part, courts hearing both trademark infringement and copy-
right infringement claims have rejected the free expression de-
fense.3 0 That result is not surprising; if full first amendment
protection were granted for the copying of someone else's work,
there would be little or nothing left of intellectual property law.
Thus first amendment arguments must generally fail, for they
strike at the very heart and purpose of copyright and trademark
protection.
Still, the necessary failure of first amendment arguments
does not mean that defendants should be discouraged from ever
raising any constitutional arguments against claims for infringe-
ment. The quick dismissals in the first amendment cases might
be somewhat intimidating, but the first amendment is not all of
the Constitution-there are lots of other clauses! In particular,
there is a mass of constitutional common law (by which I mean
judge-made law31 ) going under such distasteful names as "sub-
stantive due process" or "fundamental rights analysis." One of
the most important, as well as the most controversial, of the
rights revealed in this manner is what has come to be known as
the right to privacy. This is the right that I will attempt momen-
27 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
28 Id. at 146.
29 Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
30 For general discussions of this problem, see Goldstein, Copyright and the First
Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amend-
ment Guarantees for Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180 (1970).
31 Although other descriptions of constitutional common law have been offered, I am
not convinced that any of them makes as much sense as this one. See Carter, The Political
Aspects ofJudicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV.
1341, 1344-45 (1983).
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tarily to apply to the issue of home recording of copyrighted
works and to a few other problems as well. First, however, I must
pause to set out a justification for my analytical method.
C. A Note on Method and Meaning
A constitutional right to privacy, in the sense I will have in
mind when I use the phrase, falls within that broad category of
rights that the courts label "fundamental" and locate less in the
words of the various constitutional provisions than in their ema-
nations. It has become something of a commonplace to assert
the analytical poverty of efforts to define this set of fundamental
rights, to establish guidelines for discovering them, or to explain
why the courts "ought" to be enforcing them. Scholars in in-
creasing numbers have concluded that judges cannot undertake
to discover and enforce these fundamental rights except through
a self-conscious promotion of the judges' own values.32
Whatever the merits of this criticism, a scholar writing for
the guidance of the Congress must treat the issue in the manner
of the man who, when asked whether he believed in Baptism by
water, responded, "Sure-I've seen it done." Similarly, bearing
in mind Holmes's dictum that the law is no more than a predic-
tion of what a court is likely to do in a given case,33 it is enough
for the purposes of this discussion to agree that judges do indeed
purport to discover fundamental rights. Scholarly assaults have
not routed the judicial forces into ragged retreat; recent years
have witnessed the discovery of as many fundamental rights as
ever.3 4 The Congress legislates less against the backdrop of what
scholars think the courts should be doing than against the back-
drop of what the courts are actually doing. As long as the judges
remain in the business of striking down statutes because they vio-
late notions of fundamental right, the Congress must legislate
with the judicial predilection in mind.
This Article is, as I noted a few minutes ago, in the nature of
a memorandum to members of the Congress. It is intended to
stimulate discussion; it is less a recommendation than a specula-
tion. Thus the purpose of this Article is less to say what the law
32 See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43-72 (1980); Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE
L.J. 1063 (1981).
33 O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173 (1920).
34 To take just one such "discovery" the Supreme Court announced not long ago
that an indigent individual sued by the state to recover child support payments made to
the individual's putative child has the "right" to a state-funded blood grouping test to
aid in disproof of paternity. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
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"ought to be" than to present what a court might assert that the
law "already is"-and if the law "already is" what I will shortly
suggest, then legislation to recapture the "losses" due to home
video recording and other uses of signals entering the home is
very probably unconstitutional. But the phrase "is very probably
unconstitutional" must be understood to mean no more than
this: A prediction that a court might very likely so rule. With this
understanding, it is appropriate to proceed with analysis of the
right to privacy.
III. ONE VIEW OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. The Modern Origins
Typically, those who want to argue about the right to privacy
reach back to the basics-the original 1890 article by Warren and
Brandeis 35 orJustice Brandeis's 1928 dissenting opinion in Olm-
stead v. United States 6.3  For the purposes of this discussion, how-
ever, it is more appropriate to seek comparatively recent roots.
In its modern form, the constitutional right to privacy stems
from the Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.3' Griswold, for those whose memories have dimmed since the
final examination in constitutional law, struck down on privacy
grounds Connecticut's statute prohibiting the dispensing or use
of contraceptive devices or drugs.3 8 Although the decision was
by its terms limited to the privacy rights of married persons, it
has subsequently been read far more broadly.3 9 The Court in
Griswold cited no particular provision of the Constitution as sup-
port for its decision, explaining instead that the right of privacy
emerged from "penumbras, formed by emanations from" the
provisions of the Bill of Rights."0 The critical point in the
Court's analysis-and a point to which I will presently return-
came near the end of its opinion: "Would we allow the police to
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs
of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is replusive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."" 1
Thus Griswold turned on the Court's willingness to dismiss as
35 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
36 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
37 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38 Id. at 480, 485-86.
39 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
40 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
41 Id. at 485-86.
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shocking and repulsive the means that would be needed to en-
force the ban. The decision may be criticized on just that
ground-perhaps no intrusion into the sacred precincts of mari-
tal bedrooms would really be necessary for enforcement42 -but
the decision stands all the same, and it is not likely to be
overruled.
From Griswold, most discussions of the right to privacy leap
ahead eight years to Roe v. Wade,"3 but I would like to detour
instead through the Court's 1969 decision in Stanley v. Georgia."
Stanley overturned a conviction for knowing possession of ob-
scene matter when that conviction was based on materials seized
during a raid on a private home. In rejecting the state's argu-
ment based on its right to protect its citizens, the Court labeled
as "fundamental to our free society" the "right to receive infor-
mation and ideas, regardless of their social worth.""45 The major-
ity added that this right "takes on an added dimension" in the
context of "a prosecution for mere possession . . . in the privacy
of a person's home." 4 6 Why? Because, as the Court explained:
[A]lso fundamental is the right to be free, except in very lim-
ited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions
into one's privacy. . . . [M]ere categorization of these films as
"obscene" is insufficient justification for such a drastic inva-
sion of personal liberties guaranteed by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. Whatever may be the justifications for
other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach
into the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read
or what films he may watch."7
Strong language indeed-and here again, as in Griswold, the opinion
seems to turn on the Court's view that the government conduct
needed to enforce the statute is shockingly intrusive, and that the
relevant intrusion is one into the privacy of an individual's home.
More recently, the Court has had occasion to discuss the right
to privacy in the home with respect to the fourth amendment's pro-
tections against unreasonable searches and seizures. In Payton v.
42 But cf. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 930
(1973) (arguing that the Griswold result is more easily defended on an intrusiveness of
enforcement ground than on a right to contraception ground).
43 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
45 Id. at 564.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 564-65.
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New York, 48 a case that has been celebrated (with a certain sexist nos-
talgia) as reaffirming the principle that a man's home is his castle,4 9
the Court ruled that in the absence of special circumstances, law
enforcement officers may not enter a private home to effect an arrest
unless the entry is made pursuant to a warrant.50 Said the Court:
"In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures
of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the en-
trance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold
may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant."'" The following
Term, in Steagald v. United States,52 the Court repeated that language
in ruling that a law enforcement officer with a warrant for the arrest
of one person cannot in the absence of special circumstances search
the home of a second person for the subject of the arrest warrant,
unless the officer first obtains a separate warrant for a search of the
second person's home. 53 No matter what burdens the rule might
place on law enforcement, the Court explained, the rule was re-
quired by the right "of presumptively innocent people to be secure
in their homes from unjustified, forcible intrusions by the Govern-
ment."54 Thus in Payton and Steagald, as in Griswold and Stanley
before them, the most important concern of the Justices seemed to
be preventing government intrusion into the peculiarly private
sphere of the home.
Obviously, the cases bear no necessary relationship to one an-
other. Griswold was about contraception, Stanley about obscenity,
Payton and Steagald about search warrants. Who cares if all of them
talk about the right of individuals in their homes? The answer
should be obvious: Anyone who is more concerned with predicting
judicial activity than with engaging in a stilted formalism should
care. After all, any of these cases, at the time of decision, could have
gone the other way without causing social upheaval. Each could
have been decided in favor of the government. But all of them,
stretching over a span of nearly two decades, were decided in favor
of the right to privacy. And the right of privacy in each case was the
right to be free from governmental intrusion in the privacy of the
home. This suggests that the Supreme Court has followed a tradi-
tion of special solicitude for the rights of individuals in their homes.
48 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
49 See H. Block, editorial cartoon, April 17, 1980, reprinted in H. BLOCK, HERBLOCK ON
ALL FRONTS 26 (1980).
50 Payton, 445 U.S. at 583-90.
51 Id. at 590.
52 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
53 Id. at 219-20.
54 Id. at 222.
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Some lower courts have also discerned this tradition. For ex-
ample, in two important cases, one in Michigan,55 one in Alaska,56
state courts of final appeal have suggested that the state violates the
right to privacy when it seeks to prosecute the private possession or
use of marijuana in the home. The Alaska case, Ravin v. State,57 is of
particular interest. There the state Supreme Court traced the fed-
eral right to privacy through Griswold, Stanley, and Roe v. Wade, con-
cluding: "[T]he federal right to privacy arises only in connection
with other fundamental rights, such as the grouping of rights which
involve the home."58 Later, the court explained that both federal
and state constitutional law recognized "the distinctive nature of the
home."59 The Alaska court concluded its privacy analysis with this
language:
The home, then, carries with it associations and meanings
which make it particularly important as the situs of privacy.
Privacy in the home is a fundamental right, under both the
federal and Alaska constitutions. We do not mean by this that
a person may do anything at anytime [sic] as long as the activ-
ity takes place within a person's home. There are two impor-
tant limitations on this facet of the right to privacy. First, we
agree with the Supreme Court of the United States, which has
strictly limited the Stanley guarantee to possession for purely
private, noncommercial use in the home.60 [Here I should in-
terject that the Alaska court is referring to the Paris Adult Thea-
tre line of cases, 6 1 which placed this gloss on Stanley. To
continue:] And secondly, we think this right must yield when
it interferes in a serious manner with the health, safety, rights
and privileges of others or with the public welfare. 62
On the basis of this standard, the court concluded that the
"right to privacy would encompass the possession and ingestion of
substances such as marijuana in a purely personal, non-commercial
context in the home," unless the state was able to carry a substantial
burden of justification-which, the court concluded, the state was
not able to do.63
55 People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972) (no majority opinion; one
Justice discusses right to privacy).
56 Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 500.
59 Id. at 503.
60 Id. at 504.
61 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
62 Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
63 Id.
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If the Alaska court's summary of the Supreme Court's rulings
on privacy in the home is accurate-and I believe that it is-then the
connection of all of this to the issue of home video recording should
be a bit clearer. But before I reach the heart of my analysis, I want
to pause and deal with a potential early objection-that these pri-
vacy cases have nothing to do with the use of technology.
The objection is not even true with respect to the cases I have
already mentioned. After all, contraceptive materials, which were at
issue in Griswold, are certainly technological artifacts. Moreover, the
Court's most controversial privacy decision, Roe v. Wade, is perhaps
most readily explained as a decision on an individual's right to use a
particular medical technology, the technology of relatively safe
abortion, to treat a particular condition, pregnancy. If that seems
too extreme a reading of Roe, it is probably worth noting that a
number of lower courts have treated it this way and have even ex-
panded it. For example, in Andrews v. Ballard,64 the District Court
for the Southern District of Texas ruled that the right to privacy is
broad enough to encompass the right to obtain medical treatment in
general, and to obtain acupuncture in particular. Roe v. Wade, the
judge contended, turned on the idea that "[o]ne's health is a
uniquely personal possession. '"65 If decisions about reproduction
are particularly important, the court maintained, "the decision to
obtain acupuncture, is of equally substantial import."66 Similarly,
the argument has seriously been pressed-albeit unsuccessfully so
far-that the right to privacy includes the right to choose such inno-
vative (some would say pointless) cancer treatments as the drug lae-
trile.67 I would suggest that while there may be a tendency to
protect a right to use medical technology, it is not as clear and un-
ambiguous as the tendency to protect a right to be free from gov-
ernment intrusions into the home. On the other hand, the language
of the cases makes plain that use of technology is sometimes
protected.
Before proceeding, I ought to note explicitly one shortcoming
inherent in privacy analysis. Every argument about the right to pri-
vacy-in fact, every case raising an issue of substantive due process
or fundamental right-reaches a point when a leap of faith is re-
quired before analysis may proceed. In Roe v. Wade, Justice Black-
64 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
65 Id. at 1047.
66 Id.
67 See Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1980); People v. Privitera,
23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979). The Supreme Court has
avoided meeting the issue head on. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 559 n. 18
(1979).
1984] 303
HeinOnline -- 3 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.  303 1984
304 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 3:289
mun reached this point immediately after concluding that the
Constitution did indeed extend a right to privacy that covered some
decisions. The reader, having possibly been convinced of that
much, is moved to ask: But what about this decision? In response,
Justice Blackmun invited the reader to take a leap of faith when he
added: "This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. "68
One need not quarrel with the result in Roe v. Wade to suggest that
this reasoning called for a leap of faith. A reader who was prepared
to agree might be completely convinced by this language; but one
who questioned whether the right to privacy "is broad enough to
encompass" the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy would
find nothing here to move her to change her mind.
For those who support the right ofjudges to engage in a search
for fundamental rights, these leaps of faith present an analytical
puzzle; and the leaps are easy targets for those on the other side.
But for those who merely seek to do positive analysis-to predict
what courts are likely to do in concrete cases-the leaps of faith
present less a puzzle than an area for reasoned speculation. After
all, courts do undertake analysis of this sort, so the leaps do exist.
The speculation, then, must focus on the likelihood that the courts
will choose to leap in particular cases. To some extent, that specula-
tion can be based on what the courts have done in the past, which is
a lucky thing, since reasoning from precedent is what positive legal
analysis is largely about. But in the area of fundamental rights, pre-
cedent will carry the analyst only so far. In this area, the Supreme
Court has handed down decisions that the strict analyst of precedent
would deem hopelessly at odds with one another.69 Precedent is a
starting point, but having started, the analyst must go much further
and try to find the reasons for the leaps that the courts have taken
before, then use those reasons as the basis for analysis of the next
case.
With these points in mind, it is appropriate to move to the most
difficult part of the picture I am painting-an effort to speculate on
what a court might do if actually confronted with the claim that the
right to privacy of the users provides a defense for manufacturers of
home video recording equipment and blank tapes who are charged
with contributory infringement. I will then use that speculation as
68 410 U.S. at 153.
69 For example, John Hart Ely, a harsh critic of Roe v. Wade, nevertheless concedes
that the result in Roe is hopelessly inconsistent with the results in the abortion funding
cases. See J. ELY, supra note 32, at 245-46 n.38.
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background for a brief discussion of the right to privacy and other
signals entering the home.
B. The Hypothetical Case
At this point, let us pause and pretend that we live in an ideal
world. Now I realize that law professors are always asking a mo-
ment's grace while we all pretend the world is an ideal one, but
the world I wish to hypothesize is not as ridiculous as some.
What makes this world ideal is that every idea that a law profes-
sor comes up with can be litigated-what could be more ideal
than that?-and what I envision in my ideal world is something
like this:
Imagine that the Supreme Court has decided the Betamax
case the other way, ruling that the Ninth Circuit was correct, that
home recording of copyrighted works constitutes an infringe-
ment, and that the doctrine of fair use confers no protection. As
a consequence, absent another affirmative defense, the manufac-
turers of video recording equipment may be liable as contribu-
tory infringers. The mandate issues in due course, and the Ninth
Circuit does what it said it would do-it remands the case to the
district court for further consideration of Sony's affirmative de-
fenses.' 0 (If this hypothetical stretches credulity, which it should
not, try imagining instead that Congress has enacted a small
amendment to the Copyright Act, declaring perhaps that home
recording is not a fair use unless the manufacturer of the equip-
ment used has paid a tax. An imaginary corporation, which we
can call Sony, refuses to pay the tax and is sued for contributory
infringement. With minor changes, the analysis that follows
would be the same.)
In the trial court, Sony raises for the first time the claim that
there is no contributory infringement because there is no under-
lying infringement, and there is no underlying infringement be-
cause home recording is protected by the right to privacy.
Assuming that the obvious objections on grounds of standing,
laches, law of the case, and so forth are turned aside, the district
judge would have to figure out what to make of this affirmative
defense. She could, of course, reject it out of hand, and if you
believe that there is no chance of any other result, then I suppose
you can take a nap until the question-and-answer period. On the
other hand, given the special solicitude the courts have demon-
70 See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 977 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
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strated for claims of privacy in the home, there is, I think, every
reason to believe that the judge would treat the claim seriously.
And if the judge did decide to treat it seriously, her reasoning
might go something like this:
"Now, the defendants have made a strong showing that in
most cases, the government's interest in regulating conduct stops
at the door of the home. The government can forbid the public
display of obscene materials, but it cannot forbid the same dis-
play in the home. An officer with an arrest warrant can search the
streets for the fugitive it names, but without a search warrant can-
not search for the fugitive in a private home. The government
might be able to prohibit copulation on the back seat of a city
bus, but I doubt that it could prohibit the same activity in the
home.
"On the other hand, not every activity is subject to a neat
distinction of that sort. For example, the government can forbid
the strangling of infants whether it takes place in a public park or
in a shadowy basement. A husband has no more right to assault
his wife in their bedroom than he has to assault a stranger on the
steps of city hall. And the government has as much right to pro-
hibit experiments with dynamite in a garage workshop as it has to
prohibit the same experiments on the grounds of a nursery
school at noon. There are no cases standing expressly for these
last few propositions," the judge might muse, "but I'm sure that
all the major political theorists are on my side.
"So I've isolated the easy cases," the judge could continue,
"but that gives me only a little bit of guidance on where this one
falls. Is recording television programs off the air for one's pri-
vate non-commercial use more like the protected or the non-pro-
tected category? At first blush, it seems an awful lot like the
protected category. After all, the main motivations behind re-
cording these programs are similar to the main interests that
were at issue in Stanley v. Georgia. In a very real sense, the person
who wants to record programs to watch them later is exercising
control over the flow of information into or out of her mind. Oh,
I know it's true that most people will be recording Dallas and NFL
Monday Night Football and cable presentations of Star Wars and
various X-rated films, rather than more wholesome fare such as
Masterpiece Theatre and CBS Reports and cable presentations ofJu-
lia, but it is awfully hard to argue that all the trash on television
has less information content than whatever the defendant in Stan-
ley had in his film library. And even if it were possible to draw
fine distinctions among the relative values of different programs,
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the first amendment exists precisely to prevent the state-of
which I am a part-from doing that. So in at least some respects,
home recording of copyrighted programs is like the conduct at
issue in Stanley.
"It's also a lot like Griswold. In Griswold, after all, the
Supreme Court was plainly shocked at the degree of intrusive-
ness that would be necessary to render the statute enforceable. A
similar degree of intrusiveness might be needed here. I know, I
know-the industry says no one is trying to take these recorders
away, so there would be no intrusion. But that argument misses
the point. The purpose of the intrusiveness analysis is not to de-
termine whether it is permissible for the government to intrude,
but whether it is permissible for the government to regulate at
all. Thus in Griswold, even though the Court's intrusiveness anal-
ysis was really addressing the enforceability of a ban on possession
of contraceptives, the Justices used the analysis to strike down a
statute that prohibited distribution. I'm not sure I immediately
discern the difference here.
"Some courts-for example, those that have upheld the
right to smoke marijuana in the home-have expressly distin-
guished laws on possession from laws on distribution. 71 But there
the evil to be prevented by the law against distribution was
thought to be one the state has a right to prevent. The marijuana
itself was thought to be a bad thing. Here the same is not true.
Video recorders do have some valid purpose apart from making
off-the-air recordings of copyrighted materials. 72 The making of
off-the-air recordings when the copyright holders object (which is
not always the case) 73 is the only putatively invalid purpose for
these devices.
"Again, I come back to Griswold. The thing that would have
been outrageous there was enforcement of a ban on contracep-
tive use. But the thing the state was not permitted to regulate was
contraceptive sale. Similarly, the thing that would be outrageous
here is enforcement of a ban on video recorder use. And, by
analogy, the thing the state thus would be unable to regulate is
video recorder sale. After all, the industry asserts-indeed, the
industry insists-that it has no desire to ban the recorders. In-
71 This was, for example, the net result of the several opinions by the Michigan
Supreme Court in the Sinclair case. See supra note 55.
72 The industry disputed this claim in the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court
found that the video recorders were susceptible of substantial non-infringing uses. See
104 S. Ct. at 789-96.
73 See id. at 789-91.
1984] 307
HeinOnline -- 3 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.  307 1984
308 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 3:289
stead, the industry wants to share the profits made by manufac-
turers of recorders and tapes. But the industry's argument rests
on the presumption that the copyright laws can reach home re-
cording, and following that presumption, the industry is still
more like the state government in Griswold. There the state's only
reason for regulating contraceptive sellers was its inability to
reach the conduct of contraceptive users. Here, too, the indus-
try's only reason for seeking to regulate video recorder equip-
ment sellers is its inability to reach the conduct of video recorder
equipment users.
"No," the judge would continue, "I'm not quite content with
that discussion-it seems to include too many unstated assump-
tions. Actually, the same point can be reached in a much more
direct fashion. The distinction between controlling distribution
of marijuana and controlling distribution of home video record-
ing equipment is this: In the first case, possession of marijuana is
itself thought to be a bad thing; in the second, distribution of
video recorders and tapes is a bad thing only if they are used in
conduct that amounts to copyright infringement. The defendant
here, Sony, ought to be prevented from distributing the devices
without a payment to the industry only if it is a contributory in-
fringer. But if the previous analysis is correct, and the outra-
geousness of enforcement leads to the conclusion that there is no
copyright infringement, then there is no contributory infringe-
ment either. The state can no more control the distribution of
video recording technology for private, noncommercial use, than
it can the sale of contraceptive materials for use by consenting
adults.
"Well, maybe that's true, but it might be too facile. After all,
to isolate a right is not to say that the state can never burden it.
What matters is the degree of importance attaching to the state's
interest. In the hypotheticals mentioned above, the state's inter-
ests in preventing the strangling of children, the assaulting of
women, and the explosion of dynamite, are all pretty strong.
What makes them strong? Well, in those cases, someone else is
harmed by conduct that would otherwise be protected because it
takes place in the home."4
"Okay, but that cannot be all that matters. Oughtn't I to
worry how great the harm is? After all, one man might be
harmed in some emotional sense by the realization that his
74 As it would be expected here to insult the reader's intelligence by citing Mill, or at
least Nozick, I shall do neither.
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neighbor might, in the privacy of his home, be reading a porno-
graphic novel. The point is, the mere fact of this harm is not
enough to enable the state to raid the neighbor's house to pro-
tect his neighbor's sensibilities.75
"And that's too bad, because I thought I had found a bright
line that I could draw at the door of the house. But I haven't. I
have found a line that the government can cross in some cases
but not in others. From what I can make of the cases, the govern-
ment's power to cross that line varies with the magnitude of the
harm it is seeking to prevent.76 So the question for me is, I sup-
pose, whether an economic harm can be great enough to enable
the government to step across that threshold and regulate con-
duct in the home-and if an economic harm can be great enough,
to next decide whether the economic harm to the industry is suf-
ficient to warrant stepping over the line in this case.
"It's hard to say whether economic protection warrants com-
ing into the home. I am tempted to draw a line at physical harm
to others-or perhaps I should say a substantial possibility of
physical harm, to take care of the dynamite example-but then,
like the libertarians, I would be stuck with a principle in search of
a justification 77 (and a principle not so easy to apply in the hard
cases).78 Anyway, I am worried that by drawing a line at physical
harm, I would leave out too many cases. For instance, I'm not
sure I want to strike down government regulations aimed at
preventing employers from forcing their employees to take piece
work home in the evenings. 79 Ah, but perhaps I can get around
that-because those regulations are aimed at controlling a com-
mercial practice. There is no case holding that commercial con-
duct-conduct, one might say, that interacts with the outside
world-is protected by a right to privacy. It is hard to see how it
could be otherwise. Once one engages in commercial exchanges,
one is no longer acting in a fashion purely private-at least in the
way that word has been used by the Supreme Court in its privacy
75 Id.
76 This much should be obvious to students of political philosophy. For a constitu-
tional judge, however, it is a pleasant change of pace to derive principles from the cases
rather than from the reading list in introductory philosophy courses.
77 See generally Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE LJ. 472, 475-97
(1980).
78 To take perhaps the most troubling example, libertarian theory provides no useful
basis for determining when in light of all conditions, an individual's consent to some
transaction is not voluntary. See Scanlon, Nozick on Rights, Liberty, and !roperty, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 3 (1976).
79 See 29 C.F.R. § 530.2 (1984).
1984] 309
HeinOnline -- 3 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.  309 1984
310 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 3:289
decisions.8"
"Hmm-wait. Might not the scope of the commerce power
sometimes be such that it will trump a right to privacy? Surely
the act of taping a program at home has an effect on commerce, if
the taper would otherwise go out and pay money to buy an au-
thorized recording or if the taper is making a library (with com-
mercials excised) and will never again watch the particular
program if it is rebroadcast. The main concern of the advertiser,
moreover, is the size of the audience. Thus in theory, the making
of these libraries should lower the price that producers can de-
mand from broadcasters and cablecasters because it should lower
the price that advertisers are willing to pay. In the long run, the
lower prices should lead to a smaller supply of television en-
tertainment or perhaps a lowering of their quality, if quality can
be measured as a function of production budget.
"Now, my first response to that might be that the incentive
structure thereby created would be a good one. We need less
television programming, and everybody can go back to reading,
or watching their taped programs from what will shortly seem the
Second Golden Age of Television. I suppose, however, that the
judgment on the incentives needed by producers is for the Con-
gress and not for the courts. But even granting that I should not
care what incentives are created, the 'affecting commerce' argu-
ment is not as strong as it might first appear."
Now the judge hits her stride: "I will pass the fact that there
is precious little evidence that libraries are being built or that
prices paid by television networks or their advertisers are going
down.8" (I know, I know-the industry will ask whether it must
wait until the harms are great and manifest before seeking re-
dress.8 2 If the issue is of constitutional dimension, then the an-
swer to that is rather an easy Yes.) The real problem with the
80 The judge might or might not be aware that, as my colleague Henry Hansmann
has pointed out, carving out special regulatory exceptions for nonprofit activity cannot
always be justified. See, e.g. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981); Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
81 According to surveys performed on behalf of both parties to the Betamax case,
most unauthorized recording is for time-shifting purposes rather than for building li-
braries. 104 S. Ct. at 779 & nn.4-5. At least one careful economic analysis has con-
cluded that it is not apparent why copyright holders are likely to suffer harm from the
sale and use of video recording equipment. See Liebowitz, The Betamax Case (Aug.
1984) (unpublished manuscript). See also Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600
(1982) (a somewhat different and less rigorous approach to ascertaining harm).
82 The Supreme Court majority followed the district court in rejecting this argument.
104 S. Ct. at 793-96.
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'affecting commerce' argument is that it can be met with a yawn
and a big So what? After all, as we have known since the New
Deal and certainly since the Ollie's Barbecue case,"3 there is vir-
tually no conduct in the United States that does not affect inter-
state commerce. The sale or purchase of contraceptives has an
effect on commerce, but that does not lead to the quick conclu-
sion that the government can regulate it. So not just any effect
on commerce will do. And the sale of contraceptives might have
an adverse effect on the income of-I don't know-obstetricians,
perhaps. So not just any economic harm will do. Put otherwise,
the fact that something has an economic effect does not render it
a commercial practice that Congress has the right to regulate. At
the very least, it seems to me, an individual must invite transac-
tions with the outside world-transactions, I might add, that are
subsequent to or simultaneous with the challenged conduct.
"Thus in Stanley, the defendant had a right to view his ob-
scene films as long as he did not invite a neighbor to come and
watch-for a fee. The right of wife and husband to engage in
sexual activity in the bedroom would not include the right to sell
videotapes of the event at the corner drug store. And the right, if
any, of individuals to tape copyrighted television programs for
their own use would not include the right to offer copies to
others for a small price.8 4
"In short, as long as the conduct in the home is kept private
and not commercially exploited, and as long as there is no plain
and overwhelming harm to others, 5 the government should not
interfere. In the case before me, the home taping of copyrighted
programs is kept private and not commercially exploited. The
industry, moreover, has been unable to show the sort of over-
whelming harm that might let the government reach even purely
private conduct. Consequently, the home taping would appear
to be protected. If the activity is protected, then it cannot possi-
bly constitute an infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights. And if
83 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (commerce power reaches anything
Congress reasonably believes to affect interstate commerce).
84 Stepping outside the hypothetical case for a moment, I might note that this dis-
tinction seems to have played an important role in the reasoning of the Betamax majority.
See 104 S. Ct. at 792 ("If the [video recording equipment] were used to make copies for a
commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would be presumptively unfair"). But see
supra note 80.
85 "To answer the anticipated question," the judge might further reason, "I am not
sure what quantum of harm is sufficient to enable the state to cross that line. I am quite
clear, however, that the requisite quantum is not present on the evidence before me in
this case." See also supra notes 83 & 84.
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there is no infringement of the copyrights, there is no contribu-
tory infringement, and the suit against defendant Sony should be
dismissed."
At this point, the hypothetical discussion ends. Assuming
that the industry was not able to show overwhelming harm, and
assuming the judge could craft this stream-of-consciousness rea-
soning into a formal opinion, the defendants would prevail. It is
conceivable, of course, that congressional amendment of the
Copyright Act to overturn the actual result in the Betamax case
would include a finding of fact that the harm to the industry was
in fact enormous. In litigating the case, however, the industry
did not build a strong record on the issue of harm. Instead it
argued (1) that it is unreasonable to require that harm take place
before anything can be done about it, and (2) that in any event,
86nharm is not an element of an infringement action. (I note in
passing, incidentally, that lack of harm is sometimes an element
of the affirmative defense of fair use.)8 7 I do not pretend to know
whether the industry could show this overwhelming harm if it re-
ally tried, but I have my doubts.
Of course, it may be the case that no sane judge would ever
seriously entertain the constitutional argument I have just
presented, in which case the substantiality of harm might not
matter much. Certainly none of the cases considered by the hy-
pothetical judge demands the construction she has given it, and
none of the cases standing alone would suffice to support her
conclusion. My speculative point has been instead that taken to-
gether, the cases might be read to evidence a special judicial so-
licitude for activity taking place within the private home. I should
also note that I do not here advocate the view that a court should
rule that home taping and similar activity is constitutionally pro-
tected and thus beyond the reach of the Congress. But I do hope
that this hypothetical discussion has made clear that the issue is
not a frivolous one. It may be that a final decision would be
against the constitutional claim; I am only suggesting that in the
meantime, the constitutional argument should not be ignored.
86 Section 501 (a) of the Copyright Act defines an infringer quite simply as: "Anyone
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner." 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)
(1982). The degree of harm will, of course, play a role in the ascertainment of damages
to be awarded.
87 See id. § 107(4) (harm to market for copyrighted work is relevant to fair use).
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IV. SOME FURTHER SPECULATIONS ON THE THEORY
I said at the outset that this paper is speculative, and so it is.
I am suggesting mainly that a court might be willing to rule that
the Constitution protects the right to make home video record-
ings. There is a certain common sense appeal to that notion: If
you send signals into my home without my request or consent,
who are you to then try to limit what I can do with them? Were a
court to accept the argument I have sketched, what implications
might that have for other areas of communication law, areas that
may also involve the sending of signals into private homes?
Let me begin with what I hope is a simple example. A wo-
man I know owns a two-family home, living in one part of it and
renting the other to a tenant. The tenant has paid for and re-
ceives cable television; the owner does not. But here is a curious
thing. When the tenant is watching cable, if the owner turns to a
particular channel (the same channel, I assume, to which the ten-
ant must tune his set to receive the signal), she sees not a blank
screen but the faint yet clear outlines of the cable program the
tenant is watching, accompanied by the scratchy but decipherable
sound. In other words, with a little eye and ear strain, she can
watch cable television without paying the cablecaster's fee.
This is, I would suggest, absolutely protected conduct. One
might go so far as to say that the cable television company has
assumed the risk of technological obsolescence.8" Here, as some
of you may be aware, the reason the owner can see the outlines of
the program is that the "black box" that connects the tenant's
television to the cable is actually a small transmitter of very low
power-but power that is apparently sufficient to send a signal
through the walls separating the two sections of the house. The
cable television company, in other words, is sending into the wo-
man's home a signal she has never requested. Given the privacy
interests attaching to conduct in the home, the least the law can
say to her is: "Do with this signal what you will!"
Another example that springs immediately to mind is the
continuing problem of unauthorized interception of signals and,
if the transmission is scrambled, unauthorized decoding. Cable
television progammers bounce signals off satellites to earth sta-
tions operated by local cablecasters, who in turn transmit the sig-
88 On the other hand, one might not. Such an assertion raises normative policy
questions beyond the scope of this attempt at positive analysis. We cannot tell where to
place the costs until we decide what incentives we want to create.
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nals, often after decoding them, to local subscribers. 9 The
cable-casters naturally charge a fee for transmission of their sig-
nals and an additional fee if unscrambling is necessary. As a re-
suit, two substantial and not-quite-underground markets have
developed, one in earth stations, one in unscrambling
equipment.
Perhaps you have seen some of the earth station advertise-
ments: "Buy our dish and receive up to 125 cable channels with-
out paying another cent!" In many states, selling earth stations
was formerly quite illegal. Just before its adjournment in 1984,
the Congress enacted legislation permitting the sale of earth
stations but essentially forbidding the unauthorized sale of de-
coders.9 ° Had Congress not adopted the legislation, the en-
tertainment industry would have had no grounds for fear that the
right to privacy I have discussed would lead to protection for the
earth station business. Even were a court to accept the argument
set forth in this Article, the illegality of using outdoor antennas
to intercept signals would not have been affected. Because physi-
cal obstructions may destroy the signal, the earth stations must
be mounted with a direct line-of-sight to the satellite. So while
the signal might be viewed on the inside of the home, the unau-
thorized interception would take place outside. If, as I have sug-
gested, the Supreme Court has drawn a bright line at the door of
the house, anything outside the house is fair game. That may
seem a bit formalistic, but it may also be the law. Anyone who
has studied the fourth amendment is familiar with the equally
formalistic "open fields" doctrine, which essentially holds that
those things that are out in the open are not protected by the
same privacy rights that protect those things that are hidden. 9'
For all that it may be controversial, the doctrine makes lovely an-
alytical sense: If something is not hidden, then it is not private.
A potentially more difficult issue involves decoders. As you
may be aware, most cable companies transmit some signals in the
clear and some in a scrambled form. A subscriber pays the cable-
89 Home Box Office, probably the most successful provider of cable programming,
plans to begin scrambling all its signals early in 1985. See Home Is Where the Dish Is,
BROADCASTING, Sept. 10, 1984, at 93.
90 The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 protects the right of home earth
station owners to pick up signals for their own noncommercial use. The statute also
provides penalties of up to one year in jail and a fine of $25,000 for commercial use of
intercepted signals. See Backyard Dish Industry Gets Boost From Cable Bill, BROADCASTING,
Oct. 22, 1984, at 84-85.
91 The classic case is Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). For more recent
decisions, see Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1733 (1984); United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
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caster and receives a decoder permitting her to unscramble the
coded signals. But some companies, without permission of the
cablecasters, manufacture and sell these decoders to individual
subscribers at prices that undercut those charged by the cable
companies. The recent congressional action to permit backyard
earth stations does not permit unauthorized unscrambling of sig-
nals.92 That hardly means, however, that the unauthorized use of
decoders is without constitutional protection. Now, in the first
place, there might well be antitrust problems in efforts by the
cable companies to prevent the sale of these unauthorized decod-
ers, but that issue, which is currently in litigation,93 is beyond the
scope of this discussion. The question here is whether the right
to privacy that I have described would require that individuals be
permitted to use these decoders at home, without regard to the
congressional enactment purporting to ban them.
I am tempted to offer a quick and easy Yes, and indeed, the
objections to the use of decoders are much like the objections to
the use of home video recorders. Once again, the complaint
would be that the sale of the decoders leads to a use which costs
the cable company money and thus reduces the prices it can pay
to the industry, in turn reducing the supply of high quality en-
tertainment productions, and so on. The defense would once
more be that because the conduct takes place entirely in the
home and because the cablecaster sends the signals there, the
right to privacy protects the use of the decoder. The possible
joker in the deck is that the recipient of the scrambled signal
must be hooked up to the cable or using an earth station in order
to receive the signal (unless the receipt is by accident, as in the
case I mentioned earlier, in which case the right to privacy might
be a complete defense), and if hooked up to the cable or using an
earth station, is receiving the signal because she has asked for
it. 94 In other words, although the signal is sent into the private
home, it is not sent without consent of the homeowner. I am not
sure whether this factor would entirely vitiate the privacy argu-
ment, but the argument must be weaker, or at least different.
92 See Cable Bill Boost, supra note 90, at 85.
93 See, e.g., Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting anti-
trust defense for theft of cable services).
94 The point is that the strongest argument for the right to use signals entering the
home is that the homeowner is powerless to stop them and might as well be able to use
them. However, as former Representative (now Senator) Gore pointed out in the de-
bate over the legislation that became the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,
even satellite signals that do not enter the home unaided may fall unrequested on pri-
vate property. See Cable Bill Boost, supra note 90, at 94.
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On the other hand, the objections to the privacy argument
might also be weaker than they appear. Although I want to avoid
consideration of the efficient allocation of resources, a point that
might be relevant to the antitrust issue, I should point out that
the cable companies might be able to cure the decoder problem
by requiring their subscribers to sign contracts agreeing not to
purchase the underground decoders. If every subscriber signed
such a contract, then a court might be convinced that the under-
ground decoders had no legitimate use except to breach the con-
tract and might therefore be willing to sustain a ban on their sale.
The lack of a legitimate use would arguably distinguish this fact
pattern from the one present in Betamax, but I would not want to
make too much of the distinction. In spite of these and other
differences, I find it difficult to resist the instinctive conclusion
that if the decoder is used within the home, then under the the-
ory I have here presented, the right to use it ought to be abso-
lute, and to the extent that the congressional statute purports to
ban unauthorized use of a decoder, the statute is unconstitu-
tional. At the very least, the equities seem to tilt in favor of the
unauthorized user, although I should add that I am not entirely
convinced.
A somewhat similar issue involves the right of private indi-
viduals in their homes to make copies of copyrighted works that
are not sent into their homes, but instead are carried in. I have in
mind books that an individual might photocopy and computer
software that an individual might duplicate. Again, there are ob-
vious costs-difficult ones to calculate-to the copyright proprie-
tors, but there is also the countervailing consideration that the
copying appears to be wholly private activity. It may even be the
case, moreover, that the existence of copying equipment has bid
up the price already, since a book (or presumably software) is
worth more to someone who can copy it than it is to someone
who cannot.95 For the purposes of the current argument, how-
ever, determining whether there is already compensation for the
copyright proprietor is less important than recognizing that the
conduct takes place entirely within the home. True, absent a
windstorm uprooting a nearby library or computer store, a book
or floppy disk is not likely to be sent into the home without the
owner's consent. Nevertheless, it is not so easy to circumvent the
95 For one economist's effort at theoretical and empirical analysis on this point, see
Liebowitz, Copying and Appropriability: The Case of Photocopying (Aug. 1983) (un-
published manuscript).
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thrust of Griswold: Enforcement of a restriction on copying, at
least in the home, would surely be outrageous. Royalties could
theoretically be collected at the time of purchase, via a tax, but
then the case begins to look very much like Betamax, and it is not
easy to see why the result should be any different.
I should add a note on one type of conduct in the home that
the right to privacy on which I am here speculating would surely
not protect. I refer to the use of home computers and telephone
lines to effect unauthorized entry into and perhaps manipulation
of other computer systems. This would not be protected because
the conduct in the home crosses the brightline. Without answer-
ing the metaphysical question of where the tampering actually
occurs, it is enough to observe that the entry or manipulation
results from a signal sent out of the home, and consequently is no
more protected than an obscene telephone call or the firing of a
gun from a bedroom window.
CONCLUSION
Well, perhaps I have said enough and it is time to sum up. I
said at the beginning that this Article is really in the nature of a
memorandum to the Congress, and that is how I still choose to
think of it. Obviously, consideration of the constitutional issue I
here discuss proved unnecessary for decision in the Betamax case.
My primary hope is that the thoughts I here set out will stimulate
some discussion of an issue that has, unfortunately, received
scant attention up to this point. I do think that the Congress
should give the issue serious thought if and when the time comes
for members to be counted on the question whether the Copy-
right Act should be amended to provide for a tax on the sale of
home video recording equipment and blank tapes.
I am not suggesting that the possibility that there is a right to
record programs at home makes a tax of this kind ipso facto un-
constitutional. But I do believe that if home video recording is
protected activity, then the Congress should have no part of any
scheme aimed at increasing entertainment industry revenues
through the device of taxing the sale of equipment manufactured
for uses that the government has no right to regulate, any more
than it should legislate a tax on the sale of contraceptive materi-
als to compensate obstetricians for the income they may lose to
birth control.
Will a court one day rule that the constitutional right to pri-
vacy protects home video recording or other private uses of sig-
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nals sent into the home? Your guess is certainly as good as mine.
But the issue is not a frivolous one, and now that the debate has
shifted from the courts back to the legislature, it is one that de-
serves further thought.
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